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WASHINGTON CASE LAW
Were the Klein and Self cases argued to the Washington court, to-
gether with the substantial reasons supporting them, it is possible that
Washington too would abrogate interspousal tort immunity."
KENNETH 0. JARVI
Monopoly-Medical Services. Washington has been recognized as
one of the leading state jurisdictions in which a private organization
or party may acquire relief from monopolistic practices of voluntary
medical associations.' A recent case seems to broaden the available
grounds upon which such associations may be subjected to liability.!
The case also appears to provide some guides for the interpretation
of the recently enacted Consumer Protection Act.8
Dr. Hubbard, a licensed physician in Spokane County brought an
action for damages and injunctive relief upon the cancellation of his
contract by the defendant Medical Service Corporation of Spokane
County (hereinafter referred to as the corporation) and his automatic
termination of membership in defendant Medical Service Bureau of
Spokane County (hereinafter referred to as the bureau). The plaintiff
alleged that the operation of the corporation and bureau constituted
a monopoly in violation of the WAsH. CONST. art. 12, § 22. Finding
that the corporation's operation was not a monopoly the trial court
refused to award damages. It did, however, restrain the defendants
from enforcing certain policies concerning payment for X-rays and
from prohibiting industrial plant doctors from accepting plant em-
ployees as private patients.
On appeal by Dr. Hubbard and cross appeal by the corporation and
bureau, the supreme court upheld the trial court's findings concerning
monopoly and the propriety of cancelling the contract between the
defendant and the corporation. The court nevertheless dissolved the
injunction concerning the above-mentioned policies, on the ground
that the plaintiff had no identifiable legal interest in determining the
bureau's policy in these matters.4 The court then found that the refusal
3 4 Jacob, supra note 24, at 42 (1931).
35 Alaska does not have the community property problem, but the Alaska court
recently relied upon Self and Kleh in a decision of first impression refusing to
establish the immunity, Cramer v. Cramer, 379 P.2d 95 (Alaska 1963).
1 See Editorial Note, Expulsion and Exclusion From Hospital Practice and Organ-
ized Medical Societies, 15 RUTGERs L. REv. 327, 347 (1961).
2 Hubbard v. The Medical Serv. Corp., 59 Wn2d 449, 367 P2d 1003 (1962).
3 Consumer Protection Act, Wash. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 216.
4 Here the court cites with approval Porter v. King County Medical Soc'y, 186
Wash. 410, 58 P.2d 367 (1936). The Porter case would appear to be easily avoided
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of the bureau to allow its doctors to refer nonsubscriber patients to
Dr. Hubbard amounted to an illegal boycott in restraint of trade, and
as such was enjoinable' The court further enjoined enforcing any
policy or regulation which would prevent the referral of a subscriber
patient to Dr. Hubbard where the bureau doctor believed that referral
would be more beneficial to the patient than any service that could be
secured through a member of the bureau.'
The voluntary medical society has long enjoyed relative freedom to
adopt restrictive practices upon the contention that they are necessary
to ensure high standards within the medical profession. The first
judicial interference under antitrust law came in cases where the associ-
ations directed some overt form of action against member doctors be-
cause of their affiliation with group-practice prepayment plans.8
Apparently the courts felt compelled to intervene where the American
Medical Association and its affiliates were attempting to destroy compe-
tition in the prepaid medical area.9 Still, the federal law has offered
little relief because of the difficulty of showing the existence of inter-
state commerce.'" Where applicable, federal law has provided relief
even where no competitor in the prepaid medical area was involved.1
The leading state case in the area is probably Group Health v. King
County Medical Soc'y, 2 in which the Washington Constitution"2 was
invoked to enjoin the King County Medical Society from restrictive
practices taken against the plaintiff competitor in the prepaid medical
services area. The states as a whole, fearing that the public would
suffer from a lessening of the control exerted by the voluntary medical
associations, have not been quick to follow the lead of Group Health.
This might be warranted except for the fact that few, if any, courts
by a mere allegation in the pleadings that the complainant is being injured by the
enforcement of regulations and policies which are contrary to public policy as not in
pursuit of the association's legitimate interests. For a discussion of the Porter case
and its ramifications see Group Health v. King County Medical Soc'y, 39 Wn.2d 586,
658, 237 P.2d 737, 776 (1951). For the reasons stated above it would appear the case's
significance will fade with future litigation.
- Hubbard v. The Medical Serv. Corp., 59 Wn.2d 449, 457, 367 P.2d 1003, 1007
(1962).
6 Ibid.
7 Comment, The American Medical Association: Power, Purpose, and Politics in
Organized Medicine, 63 YALE L. J. 938 (1954).
8 Pratt v. British Medical Ass'n, [1919] 1 K.B. 244, 9 B.R.C. 982.
9 Comment, Medical Societies and Medical Service Plans-From the Law of Asso-
ciation to the Law of Antitrust, 22 U. CriI. L. REv. 694, 704 (1955).
10 United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952) ; Spears Free
Clinic & Hosp. v. Cleere, 197 F.2d 125 (10th Cir. 1952).
11 American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
1239 Wn.2d 586, 237 P.2d 737 (1951).
13 WASH. CONST. art. 12, § 22.
[VOL. 38
WASHINGTON CASE LAW
concern themselves with the motives behind these restrictive practices.
Rather, they merely accept the judgment of the associations.'
A few states have gone further than to merely recite that voluntary
associations have a right to police their own members. Their courts
have required a showing of justification for the coercive measures
exerted. In a recent New Jersey case a doctor licensed by the state to
practice medicine and surgery was denied active membership in the
county medical society because of his failure to study for four years in
a medical school approved by the AMA as required by the society's
by-laws. This denial in fact precluded him from practicing in two
local hospitals. The court found that the requirement was arbitrary
and unreasonable, since the society possessed a virtual monopoly over
the use of hospitals, and the exclusion precluded the doctor from con-
tinuing his practice."5 A similar case is Ware v. Benedict,"8 where the
plaintiff, a duly licensed physician in the state of Arkansas, was denied
admission to practice in certain county hospitals because he was not
a member of the county medical society as required by the hospital's
by-laws. The society had systematically excluded him for fifteen years
although he had applied for membership twelve times during that
period. The court negated the requirement by ordering that the plain-
tiff be allowed to practice in the hospital." A recent California case
which cited Group Health'8 with approval provided a good summation
of the policy of these courts:
We are not here required to hold, nor do we suggest that doctors who
join together in good faith with honest intention, to uphold and ad-
vance the good ethics of their profession and the cause of good health
in general, can properly be interferred with. . . What we do hold
is that the law affords redress to any victim of a combination which
has for its purpose and does act with malicious intent through co-
ercive and oppressive methods; to prevent the proper use by qualified
persons of hospital facilities; [and] to restrict legitimate consultation
between doctors .... 19
The Hubbard"° case reiterates the policy of Group Health and
14 Rockmore v. Fein, 198 Misc. 1068, 99 N.Y.S2d 409 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Levin v.
Sinai Hosp., 186 Md. 174, 46 A.2d 298 (Ct. App. 1946).
15 Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961);
Editorial Note, Expulsion and Exchsion From Hospital Practice and Organized
Medical Societies, 15 RuTGaEs L. REv. § 327 (1961).
16225 Ark. 185, 280 S.W.2d 234 (1955).
"7Ibid.
is 39 AVn2d 586, 237 P2d 737 (1951).
19 Willis v. Santa Aria Connunity Hosp. Ass'n, 20 Cal. Rptr. 466, 471 (1962).
20 59 Wn.2d 449, 367 P.2d 1003 (1962).
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perhaps carries it further. The county medical society was not a
party to the action. Instead the court was concerned with the regula-
tions and policies of the bureau, an unincorporated association of
doctors organized to cooperate with the corporation in securing to
those who contracted with the corporation the medical services offered.
Had identical policies of a county medical society been in question
it appears that the court would have come to the same conclusions.
Strongly reinforcing this argument is the length to which the court
went in order to state its disapproval of the practices of the bureau.
While refusing to set aside the findings of the trial court that no
monopoly was shown and that the contract of the plaintiff was right-
fully terminated, the court went beyond the requested relief when it
enjoined the enforcement of a regulation which did not literally pro-
hibit the referral of nonsubscriber patients to non-member doctors,
but which was merely interpreted by the court to do so.2 The court
further clearly condemned any contract which would place the obliga-
tion of the doctor to his patient below that of his loyalty to any asso-
ciation.22
In support of its holding the court relies upon the Group Health
case and upon the cases leading to that decision.23 With the Hubbard
case the court more closely approaches the federal law. The difficulty
of showing a monopoly under the constitution is avoided by the
holding,24 and the court clears the way for a closer scrutiny of the
restrictive practices of the medical association.
The failure of the court to discuss specifically any justification or
lack of it for the group boycott imposed by the bureau, and the
court's flat statement that a group boycott is illegal, leads to specula-
tion as to the breadth of the holding in the Hubbard case. Some re-
straints of trade have been held to be unlawful per se under the
Sherman Act. That is, they cannot be justified by a showing that they
21 Id. at 457. The rule prohibited a member doctor from associating professionally
with, or referring subscribers to a doctor who is not a member of the bureau.
22 The court cited Group Health, and stated "[T]he neinber doctor has a higher
obligation than loyalty to the bureau; public policy will not permit him to contract
away his obligation to his patient...." Id. at 458.
23 United States v. American Medical Ass'n, 110 F.2d 703 (D.C. Cir. 1940) ; Pratt
v. British Medical Ass'n, [1919] 1 K.B. 244, 9 B.R.C. 982. The one Washington case
cited, St. Germain v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers' Union No, 9, 97 Wash. 282,
166 Pac. 665 (1917), although stating the rule that boycotts are unlawful, was con-
cerned with unlawful picketing and cannot be said to support the rationale underlying
the Hubbard decision.
24 To establish a violation of the constitutional provision, three elements must be
proved: (1) a combination or contract; (2) dealing with a product or commodity;
(3) the purpose of which is to fix prices, limit production or regulate transportation.
See Group Health v. King County Medical Soc'y, 39 Wn.2d 586, 237 P.2d 737 (1951).
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will ultimately benefit the public, e.g., through eventually improved
competition. Thus, attempts to show such justification are disallowed
by the courts. The group boycott is one of these restraints. 5 Does
the Washington court imply that a group boycott by an association
of physicians is also illegal per se? If so, it is suggested that the
court goes too far. In a particular instance the boycott of an un-
qualified individual or group might be entirely justified in terms of the
public good, despite its conflict with antitrust policy. In such a case,
the policy underlying antitrust law should be subordinated to the
historical and established policy of allowing the medical profession
to set and maintain high standards for the protection of the public
from the unqualified practitioner.
It would seem that this is not the position of the court and if, in
this particular instance, it did not examine the bureau's actions to
determine if they could be justified, it was because the court felt the
bureau here represented was not the proper party to police the
medical profession. The proper party would appear to be the AMA
or the county medical association.
The most reasonable explanation for the court's holding in addition
to its declared policy concerning medical associations, assumes that
the court was aware of recent legislation passed in Washington." The
Consumer Protection Act which became law in 1961 was not available
to the plaintiff because this action was initiated prior to its passage.
However, the court may have rested its decision squarely upon the
policy underlying that act. Section 3 of the act provides: "Every
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise or conspiracy
in restraint of trade or commerce is hereby declared unlawful."27
This sentence is identical with section one of the Sherman Act,28 and,
as has been stated earlier, restrictive practices of medical societies
can come into conflict with this act. 9 It seems reasonable to conclude
that the court has declared its approval of the new legislation and its
intent to be guided by the federal law in future interpretation." If one
accepts the proposition that the court was aware of the Consumer
Protection Act, the Hubbard case has far reaching implications in the
entire field of antitrust law in Washington. The stringent provisions
25 Kor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
20 Consumer Protection Act, Wash. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 216.
271d. § 3.
2815 U.S.C. § 1 (1955).
29 Cases cited note 11 supra.
80 Indeed, § 20 of the act specifically provides that the courts are to be "guided by
the interpretation given by the federal courts to the various federal statutes . . .'
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of the act should provide an effective vehicle for litigation against
restraints heretofore beyond the reach of the relatively limited pro-
visions of the constitution.3
With respect to medical associations, several difficulties which have
plagued the federal courts have hopefully been set at rest by the word-
ing of the Washington act. Section 1, subsection 2 defines "trade and
commerce" as including services. It would seem that services can be
further interpreted to include the practice of medicine. This is the
view of the common law32 and of the Washington Constitution 3  Al-
though the point is nowhere discussed, the Hubbard case clearly as-
sumes a similar position. With respect to internal control of a volun-
tary association over its own members and their actions so far as they
concern the association's objectives, the Consumer Protection Act
provides:
Nothing contained in this act shall be construed . . . to forbid or re-
strain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carry-
ing out the legitimate objects thereof. (Emphasis added)3 4
The Hubbard case takes an identical position in condemning only
such conduct as would place the loyalty of the doctor to his patient
in a subordinate position to that of his loyalty to the bureau.
The Hubbard case appears in its effect to follow closely the pro-
visions of the Consumer Protection Act. The case cannot be said to
do either more or less than to condemn those practices which the legis-
lature has sought to restrict. The indications are that the court, when
confronted with a medical association case predicated directly on the
act, will follow the position set out in the Hubbard case.35
RALPH L. HAWKINS
31 See Dewell & Gittinger, The Washington Antitrust Laws, 36 WASH. L. REv. 239
(1961).
32 See United States v. American Medical Ass'n, 110 F.2d 703, 711 (1940).
'3 WASH. CONST. art. 12, § 22, as interpreted in Group Health v. King County
Medical Ass'n, 39 Wn.2d 586, 638, 237 P.2d 737 (1951). On the question of whether
the practice of medicine is a trade under the Sherman Act, the court of Appeals in
United States v. American Medical Ass'n, 110 F.2d 703 (1940) held under section 3 of
the act that such practice did constitute a trade. The United States Supreme Court
after granting certiorari did not rule on the question, but affirmed on other grounds.
See American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943). The court again
refused to answer the question with reference to any profession in United States v.
National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 492 (1950).
34 Consumer Protection Act, Wash. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 216, § 7.
35 There is, as of the date of this writing, at least one suit under the Consumer
Protection Act in the process of litigation concerning a medical association. That case
is Washington Osteopathic Medical Soc'y v. King County Medical Serv. Corp., No.
589134 (Sup. Ct. King Co., Wash. Aug. 24, 1962). The case culminates a long struggle
between the organizations and should provide a notable decision.
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